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6.1    Introduction
Mortgage brokers are intermediaries who both match potential mortgage 
borrowers and lenders and assist them in completing the loan origination 
process. Brokers have typically operated as independent service providers, 
not as agents or employees of either borrowers or lenders, and they are 
compensated by fees paid by the borrower and sometimes the lender as well.1 
Their role in the U.S. mortgage market has mushroomed from insigniﬁ  cant 
in 1980 to predominant in recent years. By 2004, about 53,000 mortgage bro-
ker ﬁ  rms were operating in the United States and were directly or indirectly 
involved in the origination of as many as 68 percent of all mortgages that 
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year (Wholesale Access 2005).2 As the mortgage broker business grew, so did 
questions about the industry’s role and its eﬀects on consumer welfare.
From one perspective, the rise of mortgage brokering was just one part of a 
broader vertical disintegration of the lending business that is widely thought 
to have made mortgage credit more widely and cheaply available to many 
households (Jacobides 2005; Gerardi, Rosen, and Willen 2007). According 
to both the general theory of brokers (Yavas 1994) and mortgage market 
scholars (El Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki 2005; U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development 2002; Guttentag 2000), mortgage brokers 
have played a role in the evolution of the highly specialized and eﬃcient 
mortgage market. In particular, brokers can make the complicated task of 
shopping and applying for the increasingly wide array of mortgage products 
more manageable and eﬃcient for borrowers and lenders alike. Millions 
of households, including many aﬄuent and sophisticated consumers, have 
arranged mortgages through brokers, frequently more than once. It seems 
likely that many, if not most, found value in the brokers’ services, which is 
what we would expect in honest, competitive markets.
On the other hand, critics have argued that too many mortgage brokers are 
not honest or, more broadly, that market failures prevent competition from 
eﬀectively disciplining brokers’ proﬁ  ts and quality of service. According to 
these critics (Guttentag 2000; LaCour-  Little and Chun 1999; Alexander 
et al. 2002; Kim- Sung and Hermanson 2003; Jackson and Burlingame 2007), 
market failures (chieﬂ  y in the form of information asymmetries) allow mort-
gage brokers to proﬁ  t unduly at the expense of mortgage borrowers as well 
as lenders. These issues are said to be especially problematic in the subprime 
mortgage market, where mortgage brokers have dominated originations in 
recent years (Schloemer et al. 2006).
In response to these concerns, a range of policy measures have been dis-
cussed. One of the most common responses has been to increase the occupa-
tional licensing standards for mortgage brokers. Pahl (2007) documents how 
state licensing of mortgage brokers increased at both the extensive (more 
states) and intensive (more restrictions per state) margins between 1996 and 
2006, and since then, a surge in mortgage foreclosures has provided political 
momentum for the enactment of further regulation. Policymakers seem to 
have concluded that a lack of market discipline and regulatory oversight 
has allowed many mortgage brokers to originate excessively expensive and 
risky mortgages (Gramlich 2007), and a more comprehensive system of 
mortgage broker licensing is often viewed as part of the solution (Kroszner 
2007; Conference of State Bank Supervisors 2007; Shumer 2007).
2. By 2006, the number of ﬁ  rms had changed little but their share of originations was esti-
mated to have declined to about 58 percent (Wholesale Access 2007). With the volume of 
subprime lending apparently falling signiﬁ  cantly in 2007, mortgage broker numbers may be 
declining further, as brokers had originated the majority of subprime mortgages (Olson 2007).Mortgage Broker Regulations that Matter    1 8 5
Despite the growing attractiveness of mortgage broker licensing to poli-
cymakers, both theory and empirical evidence suggest that licensing will not 
necessarily improve outcomes for consumers (Kleiner 2006). Even theories 
that emphasize the role of occupational licensing in enhancing the quality 
of services provided ﬁ  nd that licensing tends to also raise the average price 
of the occupation’s services, possibly to the detriment of consumers who 
prefer low prices to high quality. Some theories that focus on other aspects of 
licensing, such as its potential to serve as a vehicle for current practitioners 
to collusively impede the entry of new ﬁ  rms, may imply lower quality as 
well as higher prices. Empirical assessments of the eﬀects of occupational 
licensing have often conﬁ  rmed its potential to raise prices, sometimes with 
little or no gain in quality. However, the results diﬀer widely by occupation, 
and we are not aware of any comprehensive assessments of mortgage broker 
licensing.
In order to ﬁ  ll this gap, we examine the relationships between mortgage 
broker licensing and market outcomes. We provide some background on the 
occupation and review theories of how licensing can aﬀect outcomes in both 
the labor market for mortgage brokers and the consumer product market 
for mortgages. We introduce and summarize Pahl’s recent compilation of 
mortgage broker licensing requirements from the ﬁ  fty states and the District 
of Columbia for the period 1996 to 2006. We then use Pahl’s data to analyze 
whether mortgage broker licensing or any of its components have signiﬁ  cant 
relationships with labor or product market outcomes. We attempt to con-
struct overall indices of the tightness of mortgage broker licensing but ﬁ  nd 
that they are not signiﬁ  cantly related to market outcomes. We then examine 
many of the separate components of state mortgage broker regulation and 
ﬁ  nd that one component—the requirement in many states that mortgage 
brokers maintain a surety bond or maintain a minimum net worth—has a 
signiﬁ  cant and fairly robust statistical association with fewer brokers, fewer 
subprime mortgages, higher foreclosure rates on subprime mortgages, and 
a higher percentage of mortgages carrying high interest rates.3
6.2      The Rise of Mortgage Brokering and the Issues It Raised
The evolution of mortgage brokering in the United States and the policy 
issues that arose with it have been well described in other sources;4 we sum-
marize them here to motivate and provide background for our analysis of 
3. Some of the other components of mortgage broker regulation also are signiﬁ  cant in some 
of our speciﬁ  cations and may deserve further research (see appendix D), but here we focus 
on the bonding and net worth requirements because they were more broadly and consistently 
signiﬁ  cant.
4. For example, see U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002; Essene 
and Apgar 2007; Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007; Engel and McCoy 2002; El Anshasy, 
Elliehausen, and Shimazaki 2005; LaCour-  Little 2007c; Jackson and Burlingame 2007; Gut-
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mortgage broker licensing. In particular, we note that mortgage brokering 
has become an economically signiﬁ  cant industry, surrounded by controversy 
about the extent of beneﬁ  ts it provides to consumers and lenders, and we 
describe some of the key pricing and quality issues that policymakers try to 
address with licensing programs.
The National Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) delineates the 
roles of the mortgage lender and the mortgage broker as follows:5
  The wholesale lender underwrites and funds the home loan, may service 
the loan payments, and ensures the loan’s compliance with underwriting 
guidelines. The broker, on the other hand, originates the loan. A detailed 
application process, ﬁ  nancial and credit worthiness investigation, and 
extensive disclosure requirements must be completed in order for a whole-
sale lender to evaluate a consumer’s home loan request. The broker simpli-
ﬁ  es this process for the borrower and the wholesale lender, by conducting 
this research, counseling consumers on their loan package choices, and 
enabling them to select the right loan for their home buying needs. The 
mortgage loan process can be arduous, costly, and seemingly impossible 
to the consumer. The broker works as the liaison between the borrower 
and the lender to create a cost eﬀective and eﬃcient loan process.
  As an independent contractor, the broker allows wholesaler lenders 
to cut origination costs by providing such services as preparing the bor-
rower’s loan package, loan application, funding process, and counseling 
the borrower.
The services of mortgage brokers were not in great demand thirty years 
ago. At that time, the mortgage industry was made up almost entirely of 
large, integrated ﬁ  rms (banks and savings and loans) that managed the entire 
process of bringing borrowers and investors together. They located investors 
(depositors, in this case) and borrowers, recommended the appropriate type 
of mortgage (typically from a small set of options), analyzed borrowers’ 
creditworthiness and the value of their collateral, closed the loans, serviced 
the loans, and made payments to the investors.
By 2000, the mortgage market had changed radically (Jacobides 2005; 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002). Technological 
change (fax machines, the Internet, etc.), ﬁ  nancial innovation (credit scor-
ing, automated underwriting, securitization of mortgages, etc.), and deregu-
lation (e.g., repeal of state usury limits) abetted extensive specialization and 
5. The quotation, from the NAMB’s FAQ web page: www.namb.org/  namb/  FAQs1
.asp?SnID1916912282, was downloaded on November 8, 2007. The term “broker” is gener-
ally used to refer to a ﬁ  rm oﬀering mortgage brokerage services, while the term “loan oﬃcer” 
is commonly used to refer to an employee of a mortgage broker who actually performs these 
services. We adopt this common usage. However, terminology in the industry is not uniform 
(HUD 2002) and can be confusing, not least because the actual roles of brokers, loan oﬃcers, 
lenders, and others are not rigidly bounded and often blur. For a wry but useful summary of 
the overlapping roles and confusing jargon in the mortgage origination business, see “Mort-
gage Origination for UberNerds,” a September 7, 2007, posting on the Calculate Risk blog, at 
http:/ / calculatedrisk.blogspot.com/ 2007/ 09/ mortgage- origination- channels- for.html.Mortgage Broker Regulations that Matter    1 8 7
vertical disintegration in the industry, so that separate ﬁ  rms could focus on 
particular steps in the process, such as loan marketing and closing (the bro-
kers’ origination specialties), underwriting, initial funding, servicing, pool-
ing (for sale in the secondary market), and long-  term funding. At the same 
time, the range of potential participants within each niche broadened; for 
example, nondepository mortgage banks competed with depository institu-
tions to originate and sometimes service, pool, or fund mortgages. In addi-
tion, new types of mortgages (e.g., adjustable rate mortgages, or ARMs) and 
diﬀerentiated products aimed at a wider array of consumers (e.g., a variety 
of subprime mortgages with risk-  based interest rates for high-  risk borrow-
ers) took signiﬁ  cant market shares.
These developments both aﬀected and were aﬀected by the rapid growth 
of mortgage brokering. As the decision to grant credit became less based on 
subjective assessments of the loan applicant and more based on credit scores 
and other objective underwriting standards, underwriting moved to the back 
oﬃce, and loan oﬃcers employed by depository institutions focused increas-
ingly on sales and loan closing services. Improved communications technol-
ogy—fax machines and, later, the Internet—fostered the physical separation 
of the sales function from the underwriting function, and this, in turn, made 
it possible to outsource either or both. Mortgage brokers take outsourcing 
one step further, in that they work for themselves, as independent contrac-
tors dealing with multiple lenders. As such, brokers allowed both established 
mortgage lenders (the depository institutions) and new competitors (non-
depository mortgage banks) to specialize and to rapidly scale up or down 
their sales eﬀorts and loan origination volumes in response to market cycles 
and competitive opportunities (Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007; U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002).
Low overheads and the resulting ability to eﬃciently market within resi-
dential neighborhoods also helped brokers penetrate the emerging subprime 
market, which included many households who were somewhat unfamiliar 
with traditional mortgage lending institutions. The number of mortgage 
brokers and the number of subprime mortgage originations grew in tan-
dem (ﬁ  gure 6.1), and mortgage brokers came to dominate the origination 
of subprime mortgages (Schloemer et al. 2006). Much of the growth of the 
mortgage broker industry took place on the extensive margin, by the addi-
tion of new ﬁ  rms, as the average size of ﬁ  rms remained small (about ten 
individuals) during most of our study period (Sichelman 2003).
On the consumer side of the market, the much wider array of lenders 
and mortgage contracts to choose from made mortgage shopping much 
more challenging (Guttentag 2000). Mortgage brokers, by consolidating 
information on multiple products from multiple lenders, oﬀered consumers 
a convenient way to examine a variety of home loans for which they were 
ﬁ  nancially qualiﬁ  ed. The result was the creation of a viable intermediary 
role and rapid growth in the mortgage broker industry.188    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
The transformation of the U.S. mortgage market after 1980 created 
signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  ts for U.S. consumers by increasing homeownership and 
improving the eﬃciency of mortgage processing (Gerardi, Rosen, and Wil-
len 2007; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002), 
and mortgage brokers can claim a share of the credit. They serve millions 
of customers from all parts of society, and their repeat business and the 
multiyear growth in their market share through 2006 suggest that many of 
their customers have been pleased with their services. Brokers have helped 
to shorten the loan closing process and to make it cheaper, and they have 
enabled the mortgage industry to meet enormous ﬂ  uctuations in demand. 
However, the transformation of the mortgage industry created some new 
problems, and mortgage brokers are also blamed for some of these.
Critics of mortgage brokers generally focus on incentive problems stem-
ming from the fact that the broker is an intermediary whose pay depends 
directly on the size and number of loans originated and only indirectly on 
whether the borrower got a good deal and also makes payments as expected 
(Schloemer et al. 2006). The incentive issues arise because of information 
asymmetries between the borrower, lender, and broker. Studies have repeat-
edly shown, for example, that borrowers are very confused by the language 
and terms of mortgage contracts and related documentation (Pappalardo 
and Lacko 2007; Woodward 2003; Guttentag 2000). Borrowers frequently 
fail to understand basic facts about the mortgages they have signed and are 
even more confused about the other mortgage options available to them. 
Fig. 6.1    Growth of subprime loans and loan oﬃcers/ brokers
Sources: The Occupation Employment Survey and the National Delinquency Survey of the 
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Many are willing to follow the advice of a professional, such as a mortgage 
broker, even though they may be unable to verify the quality of the advice 
even after the fact (Pappalardo and Lacko 2007; Kim- Sung and Hermanson 
2003). This creates an opportunity for professionals, including mortgage 
brokers,6 to abuse that trust by, for example, recommending a mortgage 
that has a higher interest rate than the customer actually qualiﬁ  es for, in 
order to obtain a higher fee. The following are among the most frequently 
cited consumer issues regarding mortgage brokers (and others with the same 
incentives):
1.  Brokers steer borrowers “to mortgages that provide higher compensa-
tion to the broker but are not necessarily the lowest cost or most advanta-
geous to the consumer” (El Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki 2005, 4; 
also Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007; Essene and Apgar 2007; Schloe-
mer et al. 2006), and they do so deliberately and disproportionately with 
subprime, minority, elderly, or poorly informed customers (Kim-  Sung and 
Hermanson 2003; Jackson and Burlingame 2007; Ernst, Bocian, and Li 
2008; Woodward 2008).
2.  They market aggressively to maximize origination fees, in particular 
by persuading borrowers to take loans they cannot aﬀord or to reﬁ  nance 
too frequently (Kim-  Sung and Hermanson 2003; El Anshasy, Elliehausen, 
and Shimazaki 2005).
3.  They receive fees from borrowers and lenders that are more than com-
mensurate with services rendered (Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007; 
Essene and Apgar 2007; Schloemer et al. 2006), especially from minority 
(Jackson and Burlingame 2007) or unsophisticated (Guttentag 2000) bor-
rowers.
Asymmetric information also makes lenders concerned about the quality 
of mortgage brokers’ services. Brokers’ fees are usually paid only if and when 
loans are closed. Thus, brokers’ immediate incentives are to earn their fees 
by getting lenders to approve and close loans, and they do not have a direct 
stake in subsequent loan performance. These incentives have been seen as 
raising the following major issues for lenders regarding brokers:
1.  Brokers may corrupt the information about the borrower that is sub-
mitted for underwriting in order to increase the chances that the lender will 
approve the loan (Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007; El Anshasy, Ellie-
hausen, and Shimazaki 2005), with the result that loans handled by brokers 
are more likely to default than loans processed by the lender’s own loan 
oﬃcers (Alexander et al. 2002). The incomplete or inaccurate information 
6. This potential is not limited to mortgage brokers, however. It extends to loan oﬃcers at 
mortgage lending banks when they are paid incentives based on the size and interest rate of 
the loans they originate.190    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
can arise from either carelessness or deliberate misrepresentation or fraud 
(Schloemer et al. 2006).
2. Contrary to contractual agreements with their lender clients, they 
encourage the client’s existing borrowers to reﬁ  nance, so that prepayment 
rates on the lender’s broker-  originated mortgages are higher than on mort-
gages originated by the lender’s own loan oﬃcers (LaCour- Little and Chun 
1999).
In principle, private actions within the marketplace can mitigate these 
consumer and lender information and incentive problems and correct or 
alleviate the market failures that have been alleged. For example, over time, 
lenders can monitor the quality of the loans submitted by a given broker and 
either stop dealing with or pay lower fees to inferior brokers. Although some 
lenders began monitoring in this way, industry experts assert that, at least 
until recently, these eﬀorts have not been suﬃciently strict or widespread to 
signiﬁ  cantly change aggregate outcomes (Alexander et al. 2002; Apgar, Ben-
dimerad, and Essene 2007). Some lenders mitigated losses by pricing broker-
 originated loans diﬀerently, using higher interest rates on these loans to oﬀset 
default risk or imposing prepayment penalties to oﬀset higher prepayment 
risk (Alexander et al. 2002), but prepayment penalties became controversial 
in their own right. On the consumer side, confusion about mortgages con-
tributed to enhanced eﬀorts at homebuyer ﬁ  nancial education, but with only 
limited results. Guttentag (2000) suggested a new contractual arrangement, 
the Upfront Mortgage Broker, under which mortgage brokers would serve 
as the borrower’s agent in return for ﬁ  xed, fully disclosed fees. So far only a 
small fraction of brokers work under this arrangement. In short, as of 2007 
it appears that market responses have not eliminated concerns about bad 
outcomes caused by asymmetric information and incentive conﬂ  icts in the 
mortgage broker market. Partly as a result, many mortgage lenders have cut 
back on or ceased accepting broker- originated loans, exacerbating the steep 
decline in mortgage brokering since 2006.
6.3      Theory and Previous Studies of Licensing
With private responses not eliminating concerns about mortgage bro-
ker incentives and actions, public policymakers have entered the fray. The 
federal ﬁ  nancial regulatory agencies have promulgated new guidelines and 
requirements regarding mortgage information disclosures and subprime 
loan underwriting and pricing. Many states and local governments have 
enacted so-  called antipredatory lending laws that restrict mortgage inter-
est rates, fees, and contract terms. In addition, state legislators and regula-
tors, often with the support and help of mortgage broker trade associa-
tions, have broadened and tightened the requirements for mortgage broker 
ﬁ  rms and individual loan oﬃcers to obtain the licenses that they need to Mortgage Broker Regulations that Matter    1 9 1
operate legally. Then, in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 
Congress established new minimum requirements for state mortgage broker 
registration and regulation. In this section, we review theories and previous 
empirical studies of occupational licensing. In the following sections we 
summarize the speciﬁ  cs of mortgage broker licensing in the United States 
and assess how state diﬀerences in mortgage broker licensing are associated 
with outcomes in the labor and mortgage markets.
6.3.1      Theories of Occupational Licensing
The simplest theory of occupational licensing draws more on a mechani-
cal concept of administrative procedure than on economics. It envisions an 
essentially costless supply of unbiased, capable gatekeepers and enforcers. 
The gatekeepers screen entrants to the profession, barring those whose skills 
or character suggests a tendency toward low-  quality output. The enforcers 
monitor incumbents and discipline those whose performance is below stan-
dards, with punishments that may include revocation of the license needed 
to practice. Assuming that entry and ongoing performance are controlled in 
these ways, the quality of service in the profession will almost automatically 
be maintained at or above standards.
We can add some economics to this otherwise mechanical model by not-
ing that a key discipline on incumbents—the threat of loss of license—may 
not mean much if incumbents can easily reenter the profession, such as by 
moving to a new ﬁ  rm or state, or shift to an alternative occupation with 
little loss of income. For example, if sales skills are the key to both mortgage 
brokering and selling cars, then individuals may shift between these lines 
of work with little loss of income.7 Under these circumstances, meaningful 
discipline may require deliberate steps to ensure that loss of license entails 
signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  nancial loss. Such additional steps could include imposition of 
ﬁ  nes, improved screening to prevent expelled practitioners from reentering 
the occupation, or requiring all incumbents to put up capital that would 
be forfeited upon loss of license.8 To oﬀset the possibility that incumbents 
could shift to other occupations with little loss of income, entry require-
ments could be tightened to limit supply and create monopoly rents within 
the licensed occupation. The threat of losing these monopoly rents could, 
7. An experienced mortgage broker, quoted in McGarity (2001, 41), complains about “bro-
kers who pop in and out of the market,” claiming that they are often the ones who abuse 
borrowers and noting, “People think they can make a quick buck, but they’re not in it for the 
long haul. We’ll see every shoe salesman and photocopier salesman will all of a sudden be a 
mortgage broker, but come next year they’ll all be gone.”
8. Steps along these lines have been or are being taken by mortgage broker licensing authori-
ties. Financial regulators from about forty states are currently cooperating on a new software 
application that will make it easier to track individual mortgage brokers and loan oﬃcers as 
they seek to change the ﬁ  rms or states in which they work (Conference of State Bank Supervi-
sors 2007). Many states already require mortgage brokers to maintain a physical presence in 
each state in which they operate or to maintain a commercial surety bond. Potential loss of 
professional esteem may also be a deterrent (Kandel and Lazear 1992).192    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
in principle, give incentives to incumbents to maintain standards. The rents 
also could motivate potential entrants to invest in high levels of training 
in order to gain admittance. This suggests that licensing can raise quality 
within an industry by restricting supply and raising prices.
Friedman (1962) questioned the assumption of unbiased gatekeepers and 
enforcers and viewed licensing’s entry restrictions and monopoly rents as 
purely negative. He argued that licensing systems are almost always run by 
and for incumbents, so that gatekeepers and enforcers are, in reality, self- 
interested. Their vested interests lead them to not only create monopoly 
rents through restrictions on entry but also stiﬂ  e complaints and disciplin-
ary procedures against most incumbents. Weak discipline on incumbents, 
along with artiﬁ  cially high client-  provider ratios, lead to a decrease in the 
overall quality of service that consumers receive. In other words, Friedman 
predicts that licensing reduces the size of an occupation and leads to a com-
bination of higher fees for providers and lower quality for consumers. Fried-
man also stresses that the proper measure of quality is the overall quality of 
services received by consumers, not the average quality of services provided 
by licensed providers, because licensing, by raising prices within the licensed 
occupation, may cause consumers to seek substitute services from nonli-
censed occupations that provide lower-  quality output. Friedman’s analysis 
led him to conclude that licensing had no useful role, except possibly in very 
limited circumstances involving externalities.9
In the 1980s, Akerlof’s (1970) analysis of how information asymmetries 
about the quality of goods could lead to adverse selection and the predomi-
nance of low-  quality goods in unregulated markets spurred the develop-
ment of new theories of occupational licensing. The new models ignore 
Friedman’s concerns about self interest and also largely disregard the dis-
ciplining of incumbents in order to focus on more realistic modeling of the 
capabilities of gatekeepers.10 In particular, they assume that neither regula-
tors nor consumers can directly observe the quality of producers ex ante. 
These models then explore how the theory of licensing changes when entry 
barriers depend only on information that might realistically be observed. 
The new models include not only unobserved heterogeneity in quality among 
producers but also heterogeneous tastes for quality among consumers. The 
new models yield a mixed perspective on the eﬀects of licensing: licensing 
can increase the average quality of service within the occupation, but this 
9. It is arguable that mortgage markets are subject to material externalities, to the extent 
that foreclosures impose signiﬁ  cant costs on third parties, and these costs are not considered 
by the parties directly involved in originating risky mortgages (Apgar, Duda, and Gorey 2005; 
Gramlich 2007).
10. In fact, a common assumption of these models, as in Shapiro 1986 or Rogerson 1983, is 
that quality is chosen at the time of entry and cannot be changed thereafter, so that enforcement 
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change beneﬁ  ts some consumers, such as those with high preferences for 
quality, and harms others.
In some of the new models, licensing requirements take the form of 
unspeciﬁ  ed ﬁ  xed costs controlled by the licensing authority, broadly similar 
to typical licensing requirements such as payment of an annual licensing fee 
or maintenance of a surety bond. In one highly cited model (Shapiro 1986), 
skill aﬀects the relative cost of producing high-  quality services, and licens-
ing takes the more speciﬁ  c form of a minimal human capital requirement, 
similar to actual requirements that entrants—and sometimes incumbents—
take certain training programs or pass an exam. Apart from these special 
ﬁ  xed costs, entry into and exit out of the occupation are unrestricted, which 
ensures that providers earn zero proﬁ  ts in equilibrium.
The basic idea is as illustrated in ﬁ  gure 6.2, which is loosely based on 
Shapiro (1986). The horizontal axis represents a ﬁ  xed unit mass of con-
sumers uniformly distributed from lowest preference for quality services, 
corresponding to zero, to highest, corresponding to one. Each consumer 
consumes one unit of service per period.11 Consumers can choose among 
Fig. 6.2    An illustration of the possible eﬀects of raising licensing requirements
Notes: Key: Vi
L  the ith consumer’s utility of consuming low-  quality services; Vi
H  the ith 
consumer’s utility of consuming high-  quality services; QL  the quantity of services in the 
low- quality- only  market;  QH  the quantity of services in the high-  quality-  only market; P L 
 the price of services in the low-  quality-  only market; P H  the price of services in the high-
 quality- only  market;  DL  the demand curve for services in the low-  quality-  only market; DH 
 the demand curve for services in the high-  quality-  only market (shown in mirror image).
11. Other models allow the total number of consumers and thus aggregate demand to vary; 
see Garcia-  Fontes and Hopenhayn (2000).194    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
three markets: a market for mature producers known to sell high-  quality 
services, a market for mature producers known to produce low-  quality ser-
vices, and a market for young producers whose quality of service (low or 
high) is not known by the consumer at time of purchase. The ﬁ  gure shows 
the aggregate demand curve for services in the low-  quality-  only market 
relative to the left vertical axis (with number of units demanded measured 
to the right of the origin on the horizontal axis) and for services in the 
high-  quality-  only market in mirror-  image form relative to the right verti-
cal axis (with units of demand measured to the left of the point [1,0] on 
the horizontal axis). In the initial steady-  state equilibrium, a quantity QL 
is sold in the low-  quality-  only market for price P L, a quantity QH is sold 
in the high-  quality-  only market for price P H, and a quantity 1–QL-  QH is 
sold in the mixed- quality market at the blended price [QL/ (QL  QH)]  P L  
[QH/ (QL  QH)]  P H (whose weights reﬂ  ect the proportions of low-  and high- 
quality producers in the economy, which also prevail among the new practi-
tioners in the mixed market in steady state).
Suppose an increased ﬁ  xed cost (which might be a human capital require-
ment) is imposed by the licensing authority. This makes low- quality produc-
tion unproﬁ  table at the initially prevailing prices. In the new steady state, 
there are fewer mature low-  quality producers, represented by Q L, and a 
higher price in the low-  quality-  only market, or P L. With no other changes, 
this would raise the blended price in the mixed- quality market and cause life-
time proﬁ  ts for high-  quality producers to exceed zero. Hence more produc-
ers choose to be high quality, raising output in the high- quality- only market 
to Q H and lowering price there to P H. Consumers in the interval between QH 
and 1 are clearly better oﬀ in the new steady state, because they consume the 
same high- quality service as in the initial steady state but at a lower price. By 
similar logic, consumers in the interval between 0 and Q L are clearly worse 
oﬀ. This illustrates how, in asymmetric models, licensing tends to generate 
Pareto-  noncomparable outcomes. However, the new models resemble the 
previous simple model in predicting, typically, that both the average quality 
and the average price of services within the regulated industry will rise as 
licensing requirements are tightened. Thus, compared to the simple model, 
the asymmetric-  information models add more realistic assumptions about 
what licensing gatekeepers can see or control and yield deeper insights into 
the welfare eﬀects of licensing, but their predictions regarding quality and 
price are similar.12
12. A possible eﬀect not explicitly illustrated here is that the passage of tougher regulations 
not only raises providers’ costs but also shifts out the demand for their services, by enhancing 
consumers’ conﬁ  dence that these services are of good quality. In the model underlying ﬁ  gure 
6.2, this eﬀect would operate in the market for young providers whose quality is not yet known. 
An outward shift in demand would accentuate the increase in the price of services, boosting 
provider incomes. In more general models where the total number of providers is endogenous, 
this eﬀect can oﬀset the direct eﬀect of higher production costs, so that the overall eﬀect of 
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In applying any of these theories to mortgage broker licensing, it is 
important to consider what would be observed in the credit market if mort-
gage brokers provided higher-  quality services. The nature of the service 
is to match a borrower and lender eﬃciently, so that loans are made with 
a favorable combination of greater gains from trade and/  or lower search-
  plus-  processing costs than if a broker had not been involved (Yavas 1994; 
Li 1998). However, because credit markets are also subject to information 
asymmetries, the credit market results of high- quality brokering are poten-
tially counterintuitive. For example, higher quality might include that the 
broker provides the lender with more complete and accurate information 
about the borrower, so that loans are underwritten and priced more accu-
rately. If so, it is conceivable that better brokers could be associated with a 
higher proportion of high- priced loans in the credit market, because lenders 
would be more willing to price risk rather than ration credit if they had more 
trust in the information brokers were submitting. In other words, the quality 
of mortgage brokering can aﬀect the breadth of the credit market and thus 
the range of creditworthiness among loan applicants and recipients, and 
this can complicate the impact of higher-  quality brokering on some credit 
market outcomes.
However, if we control for the creditworthiness of loan applicants, better 
brokering would presumably be associated with lower search-  and processing-
  related costs, such as a lower percentage of loan applications being denied, 
a lower rate of bad matches that lead to delinquency or foreclosure, and a 
shorter time between loan application and loan closing or denial. The eﬀects 
of better brokering on interest rates, controlling for creditworthiness, are less 
clear. Borrowers might be willing to accept higher interest rates in a brokered 
transaction, compared to a nonbrokered transaction, if there were more 
than oﬀsetting reductions in search costs, just as lenders might be willing to 
accept lower interest rates if there were more than oﬀsetting reductions in 
marketing and processing costs.
Previous Evaluations of the Eﬀects of Occupational Licensing
Most studies of the inﬂ  uence of occupational licensing policies on the 
price of the occupation’s service ﬁ  nd a positive relationship (Cox and Fos-
ter 1990), sometimes with no improvement in quality. These studies cover 
policies ranging from restrictions on interstate mobility, such as by limiting 
reciprocity, to restrictions on advertising and other commercial practices 
(Shepard 1978; Feldman and Begun 1978; Bond et al. 1980; Kleiner, Gay, 
and Greene 1982). A review of empirical research on licensing found that 
licensing is associated with consumer prices that are 4 to 35 percent higher, 
depending on the type of commercial practice and location (Kleiner 2006). 
In cross-  sectional studies, the overall impact of occupational licensing on 
wages in licensed relative to unlicensed occupations was found to be about 
10 to 12 percent, with some estimates as high as 15 to 17 percent (Kleiner 196    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
2006; Kleiner and Krueger 2008). Kleiner and Kudrle (2000), for example, 
found that tougher state-  level restrictions and more rigorous pass rates for 
dentists were associated with hourly wage rates that were 15 percent higher 
than in states with few restrictions, with no measurable increase in observ-
able quality. Similarly, Barker (2007) found that higher state educational 
standards for real estate brokers “raise broker income without improving 
the quality of service.”
Although some general patterns can be seen, the range of outcomes 
described in existing studies suggests that the eﬀects of occupational licens-
ing are sensitive to the form and strictness of regulations as well as to the 
nature of the occupation. Thus, the eﬀects of mortgage broker licensing need 
to be directly measured. We are aware of only two studies that attempt to 
do this (El Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki 2005; Backley et al. 2006), 
and both are inconclusive, in part due to limits in their data on mortgage 
broker licensing.
6.4      Measurement of Mortgage Broker Licensing
To associate mortgage broker licensing with market outcomes, we need 
measurements of the extent of mortgage broker licensing. We rely heavily 
on Pahl’s (2007) compilation of these regulations in the ﬁ  fty states and the 
District of Columbia for the period 1996 to 2006. Pahl shows that a wide 
range of licensing provisions may apply to mortgage brokerage ﬁ  rms (typi-
cally partnerships, LLCs, or corporations) and sole proprietors, such as:
1. The entity’s controlling individual(s) may be required to be of mini-
mum age; maintain in- state residency; meet minimums for professional pre-
licensing education, experience, or examination results; provide evidence 
of ethical ﬁ  tness and absence of criminal background; and/  or complete 
required continuing education.
2.  The entity may be required to name an individual as managing princi-
pal, and the managing principal may be subject to requirements similar to 
those for controlling individuals as well as to requirements to maintain a 
minimum net worth or surety bond or to obtain a license as an individual 
mortgage broker or loan oﬃcer.
3.  The entity itself may be required to maintain a minimum net worth or 
a surety bond. Entities, sole proprietors, controlling individuals, and man-
aging principals may be required to pay fees for licensing, application pro-
cessing, application investigation, or license renewal.
4.  Entities and sole proprietors may be required to meet minimum physi-
cal oﬃce requirements, such as maintaining a physical oﬃce in states where 
they operate. To open a branch oﬃce, entities and sole proprietors may be 
required to provide notiﬁ  cation, obtain a license or certiﬁ  cate, pay various 
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and/ or name a branch manager who may be required to meet provisions sim-
ilar to those discussed previously for managing principals. In some states, the 
loan oﬃcers who work for mortgage brokerage ﬁ  rms may also be required 
to meet standards of the same type as those listed earlier for managing 
principals, but often at a lower level. Additional provisions may specify that 
a loan oﬃcer can only work for one ﬁ  rm at a time. However, some states 
allow certain other professionals, such as real estate agents or attorneys, to 
engage in some aspects of mortgage brokering without obtaining a speciﬁ  c 
mortgage broker license; these exemptions may be subject to limits on the 
maximum number or volume of loans brokered.
For each state and the District of Columbia for each year from 1996 
through 2006, Pahl assigns an integer value for the intensity of each of 
twenty-  four regulatory components. Most of the components deal with 
human capital requirements. For example, regarding the controlling indi-
viduals in mortgage broker ﬁ  rms, Pahl codes separate intensities for preli-
censing education, prelicensing experience, prelicensing examinations, and 
continuing education requirements. She codes the same four variables for 
managing principals, branch managers, and the ﬁ  rms’ employees, for a total 
of sixteen human capital components. Three components reﬂ  ect, respec-
tively, the degree of individual licensing required of managing principals, 
branch managers, and employees. At the ﬁ  rm level, Pahl codes the intensity 
of both net worth and surety bonding requirements and separately codes the 
intensity of surety bonding required for branches. Finally, she codes whether 
an in-  state oﬃce is required and the extent of exemptions that allow other 
professions to engage in mortgage brokering activities.
We use two overall indices of the intensity of mortgage broker regulation 
in a state: a simple sum of all twenty-  four of Pahl’s individual intensity 
values (the summated rating scale) and a statistically weighted index (Rasch 
index).13 In a reduced-  form sense, we can capture the major regulatory pro-
visions aﬀecting the occupation using both linear (summated rating scale) 
and nonlinear (Rasch index) measures of the system.
In addition to these composite indices, we also examine subsets of Pahl’s 
twenty-  four regulatory components.14 Much of our analysis includes a 
dollar-  valued measure of the bonding and net worth regulations, which we 
13. This index is from a Rasch-  type model (Andrich 1988) that places each of the variables 
within a logical structure based on frequency of outcome and an integer scale. The empirical 
measure of the Rasch model we use is known as a partial credit model, a nonlinear model that 
assigns weights that are consistent with an implicit structure to the regulatory system. This 
approach assumes that the distance between parameters is equal and that the categories are 
equal integers. The development of the Rasch scale uses maximum likelihood estimation to 
calculate a unique index for each state.
14. The anatomy of the regulatory system for brokers by state is generally consistent. Simple 
correlations among the individual items in our index were mostly positive, and a large number 
were statistically signiﬁ  cant. None of the negative correlations among the components of the 
index were statistically signiﬁ  cant.198    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
created by examining the details of each state’s requirements and selecting 
what we judged to be the smallest dollar option by which new entrants could 
meet the bonding and net worth requirements.15 We sometimes pair this 
measure with an index of all other requirements, constructed by subtract-
ing the bonding and net worth indices from the composite indices. We have 
also examined other subindices and individual components, such as for the 
provisions regarding training and examinations, provisions that apply only 
to the management of brokerage ﬁ  rms, provisions that limit brokerage ﬁ  rm 
branches, and provisions that apply only to employees of brokerage ﬁ  rms. As 
discussed in appendix D, some of these other regulatory variables were sig-
niﬁ  cant in regressions with one or more of our labor and mortgage market 
dependent variables, and in a few cases their presence materially weakened 
the signiﬁ  cance of the bonding and net worth variable. Further research on 
some of them seems warranted, but we focus on the bonding and net worth 
provisions because we judged them to show the broadest and most consistent 
pattern of signiﬁ  cant relationships with market outcomes.
Table 6.1 shows the top and bottom ﬁ  ve states ranked by the restrictive-
ness of their summated scale of mortgage broker licensing. Florida has the 
15. The values we chose are listed in appendix A. Our focus on the barriers facing small 
entrants aligns with the evidence noted earlier that during most of our study period the industry 
grew on the extensive margin while the average mortgage brokerage remained small.
Table 6.1  Rankings of top and bottom ﬁ  ve regulated states and changes using the 
summated rating scheme by state
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most statutory provisions regulating mortgage brokers. The ﬁ  ve states with 
the least restrictive statutes in 2004, such as Alaska and Wyoming, are less 
populous. Texas and Montana had the greatest increase in the regulation of 
mortgage brokers during the period 1999 to 2004. In general, larger indus-
trial states were more likely to impose regulatory provisions on mortgage 
brokers.
Figure 6.3 shows the more general growth and variation of regulation 
over time from 1996 to 2006, using a box- and- whisker plot. The mean value 
of the summated rating scale for all states was 3.2 in 1996 and increased to 
almost 8 by 2005. The variations in state practices also rose. As the member-
ship in the occupation expanded in response to growth in the demand for 
broker services, more states began regulating the members of the occupa-
tion. This may have occurred because members in the occupation sought 
regulation or because of public concern about brokers allegedly charging 
excessive fees or leading customers into overly risky loans.
Because of their signiﬁ  cance for our analysis, it is important to understand 
the nature of bonding requirements.16 When brokers are required to have a 
Fig. 6.3    Growth and variation of occupational regulation by state over time
Notes: This box- and- whisker plot shows annual values of the median, interquartile range, and 
outliers of the summated rating scale derived from Pahl’s (2007) catalogue of state (and District 
of Columbia) mortgage broker regulations. The line in the middle of the box represents the 
median. The bottom and top edges of the box are the ﬁ  rst and third quartile, respectively. The 
whiskers extending from the box represent the most extreme point within the range of one- 
and-  a-  half times the interquartile range (the diﬀerence between the third and ﬁ  rst quartile). 
The remaining points represent outliers that do not fall within the range of the whiskers.
16. For background on the market for surety bonds in general and mortgage broker surety 
bonds in particular, see www.jwsuretybonds.com.200    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
bond of, say, $50,000, this typically means that they pay an annual premium, 
ranging from several hundred to a few thousand dollars, to a surety bond 
company. It does not mean that the broker must own and place in trust 
a ﬁ  xed-  income security with a market value of $50,000. Under speciﬁ  ed 
conditions of broker nonperformance of duties spelled out in the governing 
laws and regulations, third parties, such as the broker’s customers, may col-
lect up to the amount of the bond from the surety company. The role of the 
surety company is to ensure that a valid claim will be promptly paid.17 If this 
occurs, the surety company will seek full compensation from the broker for 
the amount it paid out to the third party, plus expenses. The broker’s annual 
premium is thus a fee paid to guarantee a line of contingent credit up to a 
legally required amount. In setting the annual premium it charges a broker, 
a surety company considers both the expected value of claims against the 
broker and the probability of collecting from the broker for any amounts 
paid out. Consequently, the bond company may conduct detailed screening 
of applicants, similar to credit underwriting, before issuing the bond.
We speculate that this screening could make bonding one of the most 
signiﬁ  cant barriers to entry in states requiring bonds of $50,000 and more, 
especially given that the educational requirements for mortgage brokers may 
not be very demanding. Some support for this view comes from Barker’s 
(2007) ﬁ  nding that state bonding requirements mattered in a related occu-
pation—real estate brokerage—where they were associated with higher-
  quality service, as measured by a lower rate of consumer complaints. An 
industry expert, David Olson (2007), provides additional support. He notes 
that one factor that kept mortgage brokers from originating many Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages was FHA’s requirement that 
originators provide a formal audit, costing about $5,000 each year.18 He sug-
gests that more mortgage brokers would originate FHA loans if this audit 
requirement were dropped in favor of having brokers maintain a $75,000 
surety bond. For established mortgage brokers with good credit, the cost 
of this bond would be about $750, but Olson notes that “Brokers with low 
net worth and fewer years in the business will have a more diﬃcult time get-
ting a bond at all.” In such cases, the broker could seek a more costly bond 
from a surety company that specializes in serving higher-  risk clients, but 
their premiums often reach 10 to 15 percent of the amount of the bond, 
17. Surety companies investigate the validity of claims before paying out. We are referring 
here to claims they consider valid.
18. The FHA’s audit requirement may, in part, illustrate Milton Friedman’s point, discussed 
previously, that occupational regulations aﬀect not only consumers within the regulated sec-
tor but also those who turn to substitute products as a result of the regulations. During this 
decade’s housing boom, the FHA lost market share to less regulated subprime mortgage lend-
ers. This occurred for many reasons, but one reason was that many brokers chose not to meet 
the FHA’s standards and thus did not market FHA loans to their clients. We are not saying 
that the FHA should have lowered its requirements for brokers. We are simply noting that the 
FHA’s unilateral maintenance of a relatively high audit requirement may have contributed to 
consumers being served by non- FHA brokers, and that this seems to illustrate Friedman’s point 
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compared to 1 to 2 percent for low-  risk mortgage brokers. Thus, on just a 
$50,000 bond, a high-  risk premium could match or exceed the $5,000 audit 
cost that Olson judged to be prohibitive for most brokers.
6.5    Methods
We ﬁ t multivariate statistical models of mortgage broker labor market 
variables and consumer mortgage market variables. These two classes of 
dependent variables are regressed on measures of state mortgage broker 
regulations and variables intended to control for other factors aﬀecting 
these markets. Our analysis takes two main forms: panel data analyses using 
repeated annual cross sections of labor and mortgage market data, and 
cross- sectional analyses of hundreds to thousands of individual mortgages 
issued in 2005. Most of the panel data regressions utilize just state-  level 
average data, but for mortgage broker earnings we combine observations 
on individual mortgage professionals with state-  averaged data. The panel 
data regressions allow for ﬁ  xed eﬀects in each state as well as time trends. 
State- level  ﬁ  xed eﬀects cannot be included in our cross-  sectional regres-
sions, due to collinearity with our regulatory variables. As a check on our 
results, we reestimate our cross-  sectional regressions on a sample restricted 
to mortgages just in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that cross state 
boundaries, so that we can include MSA ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
6.6    Results
6.6.1      Panel Data Results for Labor Market Variables
Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics for key labor market variables as well 
as other mortgage market and regulatory variables used in our analysis. The 
table shows the growth in occupational regulation and a measure (from the 
annual American Community Survey [ACS]) of hourly wages and earnings 
of mortgage brokers and related lending professionals.19 We take advantage 
of the variation across both space and time to analyze relationships between 
the intensity of licensing and key labor market variables such as mortgage 
brokers’ employment (relative to the population) and earnings. These relation-
ships could be either positive or negative, based on the theories discussed pre-
19. The ACS is conducted annually by the Census Bureau and replicates the long form on the 
decennial Census. It provides large samples of individuals, even for relatively detailed occupa-
tional classiﬁ  cations such as loan oﬃcers and brokers. As a check on the results using the ACS, 
we also use the Occupation Employment Survey (OES), which produces employment and wage 
estimates for over 800 occupations by state on a biennial basis from 1999 on. The OES also 
includes a category for loan oﬃcers and brokers. In both the ACS and OES, the data we use 
include mortgage loan oﬃcers and agents, collection analysts, loan servicing oﬃcers, and loan 
underwriters. These state OES ﬁ  gures are highly correlated (r  .81) with the National Mort-
gage Broker Association’s count of membership by state. Similar high correlations were found 
between National Mortgage Broker Association memberships and the ACS ﬁ  gures we use.202    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
viously. An additional complication, not reﬂ  ected in the theoretical models, 
is that brokers may accelerate entry into the occupation before the standards 
become fully eﬀective, leading to a spurious positive relationship between 
subsequent regulation and the number of practitioners in the short run.20
We begin by relating regulation to the employment of brokers and related 
Table 6.2  Summary statistics for the labor market, service market, and legal and 
bonding provisions









Broker/loan oﬃcer hourly wage 20.12 25.15
(12.74) (16.87)
Annual broker/loan oﬃcer earnings 40,973.43 52,748.68
(26,177.80) (41,526.24)
Employment (loan oﬃcers and brokers/
 population,  %)
.15 .17
(.06) (.17)
Years of experience 18.49 19.51
(10.54) (11.51)
Years of schooling 14.54 14.69
(1.79) (1.80)
Mean number of loans 537,109.57 736,032.00
(679,999.52) (880,192.82)
Mean number of subprime loans 13,995.13 95,726.69
(15,213.93) (129,101.6)
Mean number of loans in foreclosure 6,214.27 8,580.52
(8,883.82) (9,444.91)
Mean state population 5,471,375.84 5,757,977.29
(6,101,905.36) (6,498,035.30)
Median household income $58,574.57 $63,504.76
(7,641.51) (10,326.91)
Licensing index (1996) 2.33
(1.96)
Licensing index (2005) 6.84
(3.68)
Bonding/net worth index (2000) 1.70
(1.37)
Bonding/net worth index (2005) 1.88
(1.35)
Real bonding/net worth requirement (1996) $15,825.12
∗∗base year 2000 (18,963.83)
Real bonding/net worth requirement (2005) $27,479.08
∗∗base year 2000   (25,928.68)    
20. This was the case in accounting, where anticipated new regulations resulted in a surge 
of applicants just before more stringent education requirements took eﬀect (Cummings and 
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lending professionals. Table 6.3 shows the relationship between bonding 
and net worth requirements and state- level employment from 2000 to 2005. 
Our measure of employment based on the ACS is the number of mortgage 
brokers and related lending professionals per capita by state. We use pooled 
time series and cross-  sectional data that allow us to estimate ﬁ  xed-  eﬀects 
models with a set of human capital, labor market, and service market state 
controls.21 Our results show that the bonding/  net worth requirement is sig-
Table 6.3  Fixed-  eﬀects models of loan oﬃcer employment/population by state 
(ACS data)
    (1)   (2)




Real net worth/bonding requirement lagged once/1,000,000 –0.545 –0.795
(0.431) (0.350)∗∗




Real net worth/bonding requirement lagged twice/1,000,000 –0.418
(0.403)
Mean experience by state –0.004 –0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Mean experience by state squared/10,000 0.993 0.994
(0.659) (0.658)
Mean years of school by state –0.001 –0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Lag median state household income/100,000 0.218 0.211
(0.162) (0.161)
Lag state unemployment rate 0.010 0.010
(0.006)∗ (0.006)∗




Year dummy controls (2001–2005) base 2000 Yes Yes
Observations 300 300
Number of states 50 50
R2 0.12 0.11
F-  Test on one-   and two-  period lags of summated index 0.06 — 
F-  Test for one-   and two-  period lags of bonding/net worth   3.16∗∗   —
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
21. We ﬁ  nd that neither the linear summated rating scale nor the Rasch index is signiﬁ  cantly 
related to mortgage broker employment at the state level. We also estimate random eﬀects for 
our models (available from the authors). The basic ﬁ  ndings hold whether the speciﬁ  cation is 
ﬁ  xed or random eﬀects.204    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
niﬁ  cant and negatively associated with employment. Using the values at the 
mean of the distribution, we ﬁ  nd that doubling the bonding requirement is 
associated with an 8 to 10 percent decrease in the number of brokers and 
related lending professionals in the state relative to the population.
The bonding requirement may have a stronger relationship to employ-
ment than the other licensing components, for several reasons. It may be 
both relatively onerous and easily enforced up front and thus may reduce 
entry into the occupation. We also ﬁ  nd that states with older mortgage bro-
kers and related lending professionals were the ones with lower per capita 
levels of employment within the occupation. This may simply reﬂ  ect the 
fact that most new entrants are younger, so that impeding entry tends both 
to age the profession and reduce employment. It could also be that, as the 
occupation matures and public policies on regulation evolve, the political 
clout of mortgage brokers will grow, possibly leading to adoption of more 
rigorous educational and experience requirements that will complement 
those on bonding.22
Restricting entry could have direct eﬀects on earnings. To examine this 
relationship, we estimate the association between the bonding requirements 
and annual earnings, using individual- level data in the ACS. Table 6.4 pres-
ents estimates of the relationship between regulation and annual earnings 
from 2000 to 2005, using the individual practitioner data for each year. The 
basic earnings equation can be stated as follows:
(1) Ln(Earningsit)  a  b1Rit  b2Xit  uit,
where Earningsit are the annual earnings of person i in time period t; Rit is 
the tightness of mortgage broker licensing through bonding and net worth 
requirements in person i’s state in time period t; the vector Xit includes cova-
riates measuring characteristics of each person and state, along with year 
time trends; uit is the error term; and a, b1, and b2 are the coeﬃcients we 
estimate.
We ﬁ nd a positive relationship between mortgage broker licensing and 
mortgage broker earnings, ranging from an imprecisely estimated 7–8 
percent to a marginally signiﬁ  cant 6 percent.23 As shown in the table, the 
coeﬃcients on the nonregulatory explanatory variables were consistent 
22. We also estimated a quasi- DID model to analyze mortgage broker employment changes 
in states that adopted a mortgage broker licensing law or substantially increased the restric-
tiveness of the law (e.g., a change of three using our summated rating scale). We found no 
statistically signiﬁ  cant relationships for the summated index or the bonding variable. We think 
that the noise relative to signal in these change results inﬂ  uenced the lack of precision in these 
estimates, which are available from the authors.
23. Estimates for hourly earnings showed generally similar results. We use total earnings in 
our estimates because of the variable nature of compensation for brokers that are commission-
 based. In addition, since many brokers are in small oﬃces where proﬁ  ts are shared, the earnings 
variable would capture this form of compensation. Further, as an additional test for robustness 
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with the labor economics and human capital literature. In column (2), we 
present a standard human capital model with experience and education 
included, and ﬁ  nd that the coeﬃcient values for bonding/  net worth sum to 
0.06 but are not signiﬁ  cant. Alternatively, the bonding requirements could 
Table 6.4  Pooled OLS models of log annual earnings using ACS, 2000–2005
    (1)   (2)




Real bonding/net worth requirement lagged once/100,000 –0.076 0.060
(0.099) (0.033)∗








Experience squared/1,000 –1.018 –1.020
(0.089)∗∗∗ (0.090)∗∗∗
Log years of school 1.262 1.263
(0.059)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗∗∗
Lag median household income/1,000,000 10.823 10.786
(1.677)∗∗∗ (1.668)∗∗∗
Lag state population/1,000,000 4.950 4.653
(1.721)∗∗∗ (1.702)∗∗∗
Lag state unemployment rate/100 –0.231 –0.046
(1.465) (1.453)




Year dummy controls (2001–2004) base 2000 Yes Yes
Observations 6,699 6,699
R2 0.13 0.13
F-  Test on one-   and two-  period lags of summated index 3.54∗∗ —
F-  Test for one-   and two-  period lags of bonding/net worth   1.97   —
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
of the ACS measure of state population as an independent variable and found results similar 
to those shown in table 6.3. These estimates are also available from the authors.
Estimates for changes in licensing and changes in wages also showed no statistically signiﬁ  -
cant impact. In none of the earnings or wage estimates were the licensing index variables sig-
niﬁ  cant when we used state- level controls. We also estimated nonlinear models of the licensing 
variables, and they were also not signiﬁ  cant. Further, tests using the OES found signiﬁ  cance for 
the licensing variables only when the Xit controls are omitted. The estimates also are available 
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aﬀect selection into the occupation, potentially restricting entry to more 
educated and experienced brokers. In this case, education and experience 
of brokers could be outcomes of regulation that should not be controlled 
in the earnings regression. With this speciﬁ  cation, the bonding/  net worth 
coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁ  cant at the .10 level with a value of 0.06. This 
suggests that bonding requirements also may inﬂ  uence the level of educa-
tion and experience and that may be, in part, impacting the earnings of 
brokers.
In the following, we ﬁ  nd that tighter bonding/ net worth requirements also 
are associated with lower volumes of loans processed and a higher percent-
age of high- priced loans originated. One interpretation of this set of results 
is that the demand for mortgage broker services is approximately of unit 
elasticity, so that as the numbers of brokers and loans processed contract, 
brokers’ fees per loan processed rise by enough to just oﬀset the lower loan 
volume and higher operating costs that result from tighter licensing, leaving 
the average broker’s net earnings only slightly higher.
6.6.2      Panel Data Results for Mortgage Market Variables
We also investigated the relationship between mortgage broker licensing 
and the volume of subprime lending and rate of mortgage foreclosures. As 
discussed previously, stricter licensing could reduce the number of subprime 
loans, for example, by restricting the number or work eﬀort of mortgage 
brokers. Alternatively, stricter licensing could boost eﬀective loan demand 
by enhancing the quality of broker services and thereby increasing the will-
ingness of marginal borrowers to step forward. To probe these potential 
outcomes, we estimated the following model:
(2) Ln(sp-  loans  originatedit)    1Rit  2Xit  it,
where sp-  loans originatedit is the number of new subprime mortgages in 
state i over period t; Rit are the state- level mortgage broker licensing indices 
in time period t; the vector Xit includes covariates measuring the character-
istics of each state, along with year time trends; it is the error term; and 
, 1, and 2 are the coeﬃcients we estimate. Subprime loans originated 
were measured as the number of all originations in a state for a given year 
that were made by lenders on the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s list for that year, or for the most recent prior year available, of 
institutions whose mortgage activity is primarily in the subprime market.
The state ﬁ  xed-  eﬀects results estimated over 2001 to 2005 with the 
bonding/  net worth requirements are presented in table 6.5. The results show 
that the two-  lag speciﬁ  cation of bonding requirements is associated with 
fewer loans originated. These estimates are consistent with those on employ-
ment. We ﬁ  nd that imposing bonding requirements correlates with fewer 
brokers and fewer subprime loans originated in the state. Quantitatively, 
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to approximately $54,000 would be associated with a cut in the number of 
subprime loans originated by about 220,000 per year in 2004, or approxi-
mately 9 percent.
If there are fewer loans with stricter licensing, does the quality of those 
loans, as measured by fewer negative outcomes—such as foreclosures—also 
vary with licensing requirements? If state licensing improves the quality 
of broker services, the eﬀects might include more appropriate loan selec-
tion and more accurate loan underwriting, resulting in fewer foreclosures. 
Alternatively, foreclosures could be positively correlated with tighter licens-
ing, perhaps because a reduced availability of brokers leads to less accurate 
underwriting or because states that have higher foreclosure rates for other 
reasons (e.g., low or volatile incomes) are more likely to enact tighter restric-
tions. To assess these possibilities, we estimate two versions of the follow-
ing model with regard to owner-  occupied properties, one for just subprime 
mortgages and one for all mortgages:
Table 6.5  Fixed eﬀects estimates of the log of state subprime loan originations
    (1)   (2)




Real net worth/bonding requirement lagged once/100,000 0.104 –0.321
(0.253) (0.223)




Real net worth/bonding requirement lagged twice/100,000 –0.741
(0.219)∗∗∗
Lag state unemployment rate –0.017 –0.014
(0.034) (0.035)
Lag state population/100,000 0.024 0.022
(0.010)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗
Lag median state household income/100,000 0.622 0.511
(0.938) (0.965)




Year dummy controls (2002–2005) base 2001 Yes Yes
Observations 254 254
Number of states (including D.C.) 51 51
R2 0.76 0.74
F-  Test on one-   and two-  period lags of summated index 2.78∗ —
F-  Test for one-   and two-  period lags of bonding/net worth   6.91∗∗∗   —
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.208    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
(3) Home  Foreclosuresit    1Rit  2Xit  it,
where Home Foreclosuresit is the percentage of mortgages (on owner- 
occupied properties) in foreclosure for state i over period t (as measured in 
the National Delinquency Survey of the Mortgage Bankers Association of 
America, 1979 to 2005); Rit are the state- level measures of mortgage broker 
bonding/ net worth requirements in time period t; the vector Xit includes cova-
riates measuring characteristics of each state, along with year time trends; 
it is the error term; and , 1, and 2 are the coeﬃcients we estimate.
As shown in table 6.6 for the estimation period January 1999 through 
2004, we ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant positive relationship between bonding/  net worth 
requirements and foreclosure rates for both subprime and all mortgages 
Table 6.6  Fixed-  eﬀects models of the percentage of loans (subprime and all loans) 
in foreclosure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
    Subprime   Subprime   All loans   All loans
Summated reg. index lagged once (no net 
worth/bonding)
0.022 0.004 0.016 0.021
(0.093) (0.078) (0.016) (0.014)
Real net worth/bonding requirement lagged 
once/100,000
1.357 3.186 0.217 0.540
(1.585) (1.245)∗∗ (0.280) (0.226)∗∗








Lag state unemployment rate 0.873 0.970 0.222 0.251
(0.224)∗∗∗ (0.196)∗∗∗ (0.040)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗∗
Lag state population/100,000 –0.005 –0.059 –0.032 –0.033
(0.069) (0.055) (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
Lag median state household income/100,000 –5.080 –7.396 –1.560 –3.003
(6.709) (6.059) (1.187) (1.100)∗∗∗
State home ownership percentage –0.292 –0.319 –0.057 –0.057
(0.087)∗∗∗ (0.080)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗
Constant 27.444 28.629 6.617 6.673
(7.197)∗∗∗ (6.168)∗∗∗ (1.273)∗∗∗ (1.120)∗∗∗
Year dummy controls (2000–2004) base 1999 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 255 306 255 306
Number of States (including D.C.) 51 51 51 51
R2 0.66 0.63 0.42 0.43
F-  Test on one-   and two-  period lags of 
summated index 0.50 — 1.46 — 
F-  Test for one-   and two-  period lags of 
bonding/net worth   5.51∗∗∗   —   3.29∗∗   —
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Mortgage Broker Regulations that Matter    2 0 9
when state- level labor market and service market factors are also controlled 
for. The estimates are consistent with the view, discussed previously, that 
occupational regulation reduces the quality of an occupation’s output. How-
ever, our results do not clarify the mechanism by which mortgage broker 
bonding would lead to higher foreclosures.
We have noted that the positive relationship between bonding and fore-
closures could arise because states enact bonding or net worth requirements 
in response to previous periods of high foreclosure. As a check on this pos-
sibility (Autor 2003), we estimated the relationship between lagged subprime 
and lagged overall foreclosures and subsequent passage of a bonding or net 
worth requirement. Table 6.7, using a Weibull hazard model with similar 
covariates to those in tables 6.5 and 6.6, shows that the relationship is not 
statistically signiﬁ  cant, indicating an absence of this form of simultaneity 
bias.24
One ﬁ  nal issue we address in this section is presented in table 6.8, which 
shows the relationship of bonding/  net worth requirements to home owner-
ship. Using the same type of model as table 6.6, we estimate the relationship 
Table 6.7  Hazard model estimates of time to adoption of a net worth or bonding bill 
1998–2005 (Using a Weibull distribution of duration)
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)








Avg. state unemployment rate 1998–2000 0.186 0.185
(0.386) (0.390)
Avg. state population 1998–2000/1,000,000 –0.030 –0.050
(0.062) (0.072)








Constant –3.742 –2.029 –3.422 –2.858
(1.274)∗∗∗ (7.921) (1.113)∗∗∗ (8.308)
Observations   17   17   17   17
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
24. Appendix B discusses evidence that the political initiatives leading to higher mortgage 
broker bonding requirements are often led by industry associations or state regulators rather 
than consumer groups, although consumer issues and competing consumer regulatory propos-
als sometimes serve to motivate mortgage broker associations to put forward their own bonding 
proposals. Causality may involve complicated feedback chains and substantial time delays.210    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
of mortgage broker bonding/  net worth requirements and home ownership. 
We ﬁ nd that income is positively related to home ownership, but that there 
is no statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship between our measures of regulation 
and home ownership. Although bonding may matter for the quantity and 
quality of subprime mortgages, it does not seem to vary with the overall rate 
of state home ownership. This might reﬂ  ect the fact that mortgage origina-
tions are ﬂ  ow variables and hence can change more from year to year than 
a stock variable like home ownership.
6.6.3      Cross-  Sectional Data Results for Mortgage Market Variables
Brokers have short-  term incentives to sell high-  priced loans to consum-
ers. The federal banking regulators track high-  priced loans through the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data collection, which records 
most home mortgage applications and originations in the United States. 
We focus on ﬁ  rst-  lien mortgages in our analysis. A high-  priced ﬁ  rst-  lien 
mortgage is deﬁ  ned as one whose annual percentage rate (APR) is 3 or more 
percentage points above the contemporaneous thirty-  year Treasury bond 
yield. The APR is deﬁ  ned essentially as an internal rate of return, taking into 
account initial fees and introductory rates and setting any index variables 
Table 6.8  Fixed-  eﬀects models of state home ownership percentage
    (1)   (2)
Real bonding/net worth requirement lagged once/100,000 0.881 1.206
(1.154) (0.943)
Real bonding/net worth requirement lagged twice/100,000 0.582
(1.188)
Lag state unemployment rate –0.194 –0.191
(0.155) (0.155)
Lag state population/100,000 0.066 0.066
(0.043) (0.043)




Year dummy controls (2000–2004) base 1999 Yes Yes
Observations 306 306
Number of states (including D.C.) 51 51
R2 0.26 0.26
F-  Test for one-   and two-  period lags of net worth/bonding 
requirements   0.94   —
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Mortgage Broker Regulations that Matter    2 1 1
in the contract at current market values, assuming they remain constant for 
the scheduled maturity of the loan.
If mortgage broker licensing succeeds in protecting consumers, high-
 priced loans may be reduced.25 However, as discussed in our theory section, 
this is not the only possible outcome, and the theoretical eﬀects of licensing 
regulations are ambiguous.
We assess the empirical relationship between mortgage broker regula-
tion and the probability that a mortgage will be high priced. We primarily 
consider broker-  originated loans. We could, in addition, assess how bro-
ker regulation aﬀects the chance that any mortgage, brokered or not, is 
high priced. This also would be plausible, since mortgage brokers compete 
strongly with other mortgage origination providers. However, looking at the 
entire mortgage market could weaken our ability to detect the direct eﬀects 
of mortgage broker regulation, so we prefer to focus as closely as we can on 
broker- originated  mortgages.
Focusing on brokered mortgages, however, confronts us with the problem 
that the HMDA data do not indicate whether a mortgage was brokered. 
We use two strategies to proxy for this missing information. For federally 
regulated banks and thrifts, we use the borrowers’ location (available at 
the Census tract level from the HMDA data) to condition on whether the 
loan was made outside the lender’s Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
assessment area. Under the CRA, federally regulated banks and thrifts must 
declare an assessment area where the degree of services they provide will be 
evaluated for compliance with the CRA. Typically these areas include the 
lender’s principal retail oﬃces, and lenders generally have fewer oﬃces out-
side their assessment area. Federally regulated lenders are presumed to rely 
on their retail oﬃces to originate the majority of their mortgages within their 
assessment areas but to rely much more on brokers to reach mortgage cus-
tomers outside their assessment areas (Avery, Brevoort, and Canner 2006; 
Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007). Accordingly, for federally regulated 
banks and thrifts, we focus on mortgages originated outside each reporting 
lender’s CRA assessment area.26
For mortgage banks not subject to the CRA, we rely on reports from 
industry publications and industry experts to identify a set of lenders known 
to rely almost exclusively on mortgage brokers for loan applications. For 
one lender, Option One, we have conﬁ  rmed with a senior employee that in 
2005, the year we study, the ﬁ  rm obtained almost all of its mortgage applica-
25. Two separate studies, based on proprietary data from selected major lenders’ mortgages 
originated in 2002, suggest that, on average, consumers using brokers did get lower- priced loans 
than other borrowers, when other factors were controlled for. See El Anshasy, Elliehausen, and 
Shimazaki (2005) and LaCour-  Little (2007b). Results to the contrary were found by LaCour-
 Little  (2007c).
26. To keep the size of the data set manageable, we used a 50 percent random sample of the 
2005 HMDA data from CRA-  regulated mortgage originators.212    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
tions through brokers. An industry expert, Thomas LaMalfa of Wholesale 
Access, helped us identify nine other “broker-  dependent” mortgage origi-
nators in 2005: Taylor, Bean, and Whitaker Mortgage Co.; First Magnus 
Financial Corporation; American Mortgage Network; Loan City; Green 
Point Mortgage Funding; Argent Mortgage Company; New Century Mort-
gage Corporation; Nova Star Home Mortgage; and Résumé.27
In tables 6.9 and 6.10, we estimate linear probability models for whether 
a loan is high- priced using four diﬀerent data sets.28 We cluster observations 
by states to compute robust standard errors that allow for less than full inde-
pendence among the observations in each state. We control for the state regu-
latory environment, borrower’s income and racial/  ethnic identity, the loan 
amount, and several economic and demographic properties of the Census 
tract where the property is located (the distribution of credit scores, unem-
ployment rate, median age, median age of housing stock, percent minority 
population, median income, and the percentage of owner-  occupied and 
vacant housing units).
For mortgage reﬁ  nancing, the results are fairly consistent. However, there 
is a clear diﬀerence in the size of the constant term, which is low for the CRA 
lenders outside their assessment areas (0.10) and higher for the ten broker-
  dependent lenders (0.38). The 2005 national average was 0.26 for ﬁ  rst-  lien 
reﬁ  nance mortgages. Although this gives a very diﬀerent starting point to 
the two reﬁ  nancing regressions, the marginal eﬀects of many of the explana-
tory variables are similar. The coeﬃcients on the mortgage broker regulatory 
variables for 2004 are of primary interest here. In tables 6.9 and 6.10, the 
coeﬃcient on the bonding/ net worth requirement is positive and signiﬁ  cant, 
indicating that a $100,000 increase in this requirement is associated with, 
respectively, a 5.4 or a 3.5 percentage point increase in the probability that 
a reﬁ  nancing is high priced. The coeﬃcient on the index of other mortgage 
broker regulations is not signiﬁ  cant in table 6.9 but is marginally signiﬁ  cant 
at a 10 percent level, with a negative coeﬃcient, in table 6.10.
Our results for two other regulatory variables—an index of state anti- 
predatory lending laws and an indicator of states that prohibit deﬁ  ciency 
judgments—are also consistent across the reﬁ  nancing regressions in tables 
6.9 and 6.10. The coeﬃcient on the index of anti-  predatory lending laws is 
negative but not signiﬁ  cant at a 10 percent level. The coeﬃcient on the in-
dicator of no deﬁ  ciency judgments is signiﬁ  cant but with an unexpected neg-
ative sign, suggesting that high-  priced loans are less likely in states that do 
not allow creditors to pursue deﬁ  ciency judgments. A possible explanation 
27. Their respective HMDA respondent ID numbers are 7499100008; 7979400002; 
1788100000; 7428900001; 13-  3210378; 1917700009; 7900200006; both 1512400000 and 
1707500002 for Nova Star; and 1991500005. To make the data more manageable, we again 
took a 50 percent random sample.
28. We have estimated probit models for each of these regressions and obtained very similar 
results.Table 6.9  Linear probability of a high-  priced loan in a cross section of ten broker- 
dependent lenders mortgages
   
Mortgage 
reﬁ  nance 








Index of other state broker licensing requirements 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Index of state anti-  predatory lending laws –0.012 0.004
(0.008) (0.009)




Borrower’s income ($1,000) –0.505 –0.280
(0.077)∗∗∗ (0.068)∗∗∗
Borrower’s income squared ($1,000,000) 0.093 0.035
(0.020)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Adults in Census tract with very low credit score (%) 0.005 0.006
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
African-  American borrower (dummy variable) 0.146 0.173
(0.018)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Asian-  American borrower (dummy variable) –0.060 –0.032
(0.019)∗∗∗ (0.023)
Hispanic borrower (dummy variable) 0.074 0.119
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.019)∗∗∗




Number of state clusters for standard errors 
(D.C. included) 51 51
R2   0.095   0.107
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Ordinary least- squares estimate of the probability that 
a mortgage is high-  priced, using a 50 percent random sample of HMDA data on ﬁ  rst-  lien 
conventional mortgages originated in 2005 by ten broker-  dependent lenders. The sample is 
further restricted to HMDA loan records in which the primary applicants’ ethnicity, sex, and 
race are available and applicable to a person (not a business) and in which the property is an 
owner-  occupied, one to four family nonmanufactured unit. Additional explanatory variables 
not presented include loan size; loan size squared; dummy variables indicating if the borrower 
is Hawaiian/Paciﬁ  c Islander or American Indian/Alaska Native; percentage of credit ﬁ  les in 
the Census tract that lack a credit score; tract-  level Census variables for the unemployment 
rate, median age of persons, median age of housing units, percent minority population, me-
dian income, percentage of housing units that are owner- occupied, and percentage of housing 
units that are vacant. Full results are available upon request. See appendix C for more detailed 
deﬁ  nitions of the variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Table 6.10  Linear probability of a high-  priced loan in a cross section of CRA- 
regulated lenders’ mortgages made outside their CRA assessment areas 
in 2005
   
Mortgage 
reﬁ  nance 








Index of other state broker licensing requirements –0.0029 –0.0008
(0.0017)∗ (0.0015)
Index of state anti-  predatory lending laws –0.006 0.0005
(0.004) (0.0046)




Borrower’s income ($1,000) –0.272 –0.183
(0.022)∗∗∗ (0.035)∗∗∗
Borrower’s income squared ($1,000,000) 0.034 0.035
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
Adults in Census tract with very low credit score (%) 0.0058 0.0062
(0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0004)∗∗∗
African-  American borrower (dummy variable) 0.211 0.344
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗
Asian-  American borrower (dummy variable) 0.002 –0.012
(0.010) (0.012)
Hispanic borrower (dummy variable) 0.093 0.197
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗




Number of state clusters for standard errors 
(D.C. included)
51 51
R2   0.093   0.141
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Ordinary least- squares estimate of the probability that 
a mortgage is high priced, using a 50 percent random sample of HMDA data on ﬁ  rst-  lien 
conventional mortgages originated in 2005 by lenders subject to the Community Reinvest-
ment Act. The sample is further restricted to HMDA loan records in which the primary ap-
plicants’ ethnicity, sex, and race are available and applicable to a person (not a business) and 
in which the property is an owner-  occupied, one-   to four-  family nonmanufactured unit. Ad-
ditional explanatory variables not presented include loan size; loan size squared; dummy vari-
ables indicating if the borrower is Hawaiian/Paciﬁ  c Islander or American Indian/Alaska Na-
tive; percentage of credit ﬁ  les in the Census tract that lack a credit score; tract-  level Census 
variables for the unemployment rate, median age of persons, median age of housing units, 
percent minority population, median income, percentage of housing units that are owner oc-
cupied, and percentage of housing units that are vacant. Full results are available upon re-
quest. See appendix C for more detailed deﬁ  nitions of the variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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is that lenders ration credit more strictly in states that rule out deﬁ  ciency judg-
ments but use risk-  based pricing to lend to a wider selection of applicants 
where they have the right to pursue a deﬁ  ciency judgment.29
The coeﬃcient on the percentage of adults in the Census tract of the 
mortgaged property who have very low credit scores is consistently positive 
and signiﬁ  cant in tables 6.9 and 6.10. A 10 percentage point increase in the 
percentage of adults in the tract with a very low score is associated with 
about a 5 to 6 percentage point increase in the probability that a mortgage 
reﬁ  nance loan in that tract will be high priced.30
African-  American, Hispanic, and female borrowers are signiﬁ  cantly 
more likely to get a high- priced mortgage reﬁ  nancing than are non- Hispanic 
white male borrowers. The largest eﬀect is for African-  American borrow-
ers. For example, for mortgage reﬁ  nance loans by federally regulated banks 
and thrifts lending outside their CRA assessment areas, the probability of a 
high- priced loan increases by 21 percentage points for an African- American 
borrower, compared to increases of 9 percentage points for Hispanics and 
4 percentage points for women. For other racial groups we ﬁ  nd no signiﬁ  -
cant eﬀects, except that Asian-  Americans reﬁ  nancing with the ten broker-
  dependent lenders are about 6 percentage points less likely to get a high-
 priced  loan.
Our results for the regulatory variables are not as strong or as consistent 
with home- purchase mortgages as with mortgage reﬁ  nance loans. We again 
start with very diﬀerent constant terms. However, the bonding/  net worth 
variable is positive and signiﬁ  cant at a 10 percent level for the ten broker-
  dependent lenders but has an insigniﬁ  cant and small negative coeﬃcient 
for the CRA- regulated lenders on loans outside their assessment areas. The 
index of the remaining mortgage broker regulations is insigniﬁ  cant in the 
home-  purchase regressions, as is the index of anti-  predatory lending laws. 
The indicator of no deﬁ  ciency judgments is again negative and signiﬁ  cant 
for the broker-  dependent lenders, but it is now insigniﬁ  cant for the CRA-
 regulated lenders’ loans outside their assessment areas. Apparently, the pro-
cess for making home-  purchase loans diﬀers in important ways from the 
process for making mortgage reﬁ  nance loans, at least at the CRA- regulated 
institutions.31
In results not shown, but available from the authors, we repeated the esti-
mates in table 6.10 for mortgages made within the CRA assessment areas of 
29. We thank Karen Pence for bringing this possibility to our attention.
30. In the full regression results underlying tables 6.9 and 6.10, the coeﬃcient on another 
credit score variable—the percentage of adults with a credit ﬁ  le who lack a credit score—is 
signiﬁ  cantly positive but smaller for the CRA-  regulated lenders but not signiﬁ  cant for the ten 
broker- dependent  lenders.
31. For the home-  purchase mortgages examined in table 6.10, the coeﬃcients on the credit 
score and racial/ ethnic variables have a pattern of statistical signiﬁ  cance not too diﬀerent than 
for the mortgage reﬁ  nance loans in table 6.9, although the size of the coeﬃcients often diﬀers 
substantially.216    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
CRA-  regulated lenders. None of the regulatory variables were statistically 
signiﬁ  cant, except the coeﬃcient on the indicator of no deﬁ  ciency judg-
ments was signiﬁ  cant and positive for home- purchase mortgages. The insig-
niﬁ  cance of the mortgage broker regulation variables in these regressions is 
consistent with our presumption that loans within a CRA assessment area 
are much less likely to involve a mortgage broker. We have no clear expla-
nation yet for why the results for the indicator of no deﬁ  ciency judgments 
change. As Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2006) note, CRA-  regulated lend-
ers’ mortgage underwriting appears to be quite diﬀerent inside, compared 
to outside, their assessment areas. They speculate that one explanation may 
be the use of diﬀering marketing channels, including greater use of brokers 
outside assessment areas.
To limit the potential eﬀects of unmeasured location-  speciﬁ  c eﬀects, we 
reestimate with a sample restricted to only observations in MSAs that strad-
dle state borders, similar to the methods in Holmes (1998) and Bostic et al. 
(2007). We have data on ﬁ  fty-  one MSAs that cross state boundaries, touch-
ing parts of thirty-  nine states.32 We estimate the same equations as in tables 
6.9 and 6.10 but with ﬁ  xed eﬀects for each MSA, which has the advantage of 
controlling for location- speciﬁ  c factors not measured by our other variables, 
such as the percentage of loans with adjustable rates or the level or rate of 
change in housing prices (LaCour-  Little 2007a). This is useful, because the 
nature of our interest rate data (a single cross section) precludes controlling 
for these factors by means of state ﬁ  xed eﬀects (because they would be col-
linear with our state-  level policy variables).
For the data from the broker- dependent lenders, the results on the sample 
from multistate MSAs for the bonding variable (and most of the other vari-
ables) are similar to those in table 6.9.33 In particular, for mortgage reﬁ  nanc-
ing loans by the broker- dependent lenders, the coeﬃcient on the state broker 
bonding variable has a t- statistic of 2.05 and a coeﬃcient of 0.048, compared 
to 0.054 in table 6.9. For home-  purchase mortgages from the same lenders, 
the coeﬃcient on the bonding variable has a 1.96 t- statistic and a coeﬃcient 
of 0.041, compared to 0.050 in table 6.9. By contrast, for the sample from 
multistate MSAs, the results (with ﬁ  xed eﬀects) for reﬁ  nanced mortgages 
by the CRA lenders outside their assessment areas include an insigniﬁ  cant 
coeﬃcient of just 0.01 on the bonding variable, in contrast to the signiﬁ  cant 
coeﬃcient of 0.035 in table 6.10. For home-  purchase loans by CRA lend-
ers outside their assessment areas, the coeﬃcient on the bonding variable is 
32. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.
33. The parallels are even closer if we estimate on just the split MSAs but without ﬁ  xed 
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–0.004 and insigniﬁ  cant for the multistate MSA sample with ﬁ  xed eﬀects, 
very similar to the results in table 6.10.
Thus the results for table 6.9, with data almost exclusively on broker-
 originated loans, are reasonably robust to location- speciﬁ  c eﬀects not explic-
itly controlled for in our model. These results are also robust to the omission 
of data from the twelve states without multistate MSAs, including Califor-
nia. However, the same is not true of our results for mortgage reﬁ  nance loans 
by CRA lenders outside their assessment areas, which probably consist of a 
mixture of broker- originated and other loans. The coeﬃcient on the bonding 
variable for those loans becomes marginally insigniﬁ  cant when observations 
from the twelve states without border-  crossing MSAs are dropped from 
the full sample or when estimated on the multistate MSA sample without 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects. With ﬁ  xed eﬀects on the multistate MSA sample, the coeﬃcient 
becomes clearly insigniﬁ  cant.
6.7    Conclusions
Mortgage brokers are an emerging regulated occupation in the United 
States. About thirty years ago, there were almost no mortgage brokers, 
because individuals who wanted a loan to buy or reﬁ  nance a house went 
to a bank or savings and loan. With deregulation of ﬁ  nancial services and 
technology improvements that allowed easy development and dissemination 
of credit scores, this picture began to change, and in 2004 as much as two-
  thirds of all housing ﬁ  nance was initiated through a mortgage broker.
We examine the relationships between state regulation of mortgage bro-
kers and outcomes in the labor and mortgage markets. We ﬁ  nd that the 
relationship between mortgage broker licensing and market outcomes diﬀers 
among the types of licensing requirements; in particular, ﬁ  nancial bonding 
or net worth requirements are associated with somewhat higher earnings, 
modest reductions in the number of mortgage brokers, and the number of 
subprime loans originated as well as with somewhat higher foreclosure rates 
and higher interest rates on brokered loans.
Further analysis is needed to more clearly establish whether these rela-
tionships are robust and whether they reﬂ  ect a causal link between broker 
regulation and market outcomes. However, we would draw attention to a 
few features of the results presented previously. First, the overall pattern of 
our results suggests that requiring mortgage brokers to maintain a surety 
bond or a minimum net worth may aﬀect market outcomes, and that the net 
eﬀects may not beneﬁ  t consumers. Without a deeper understanding of the 
causal linkages underlying our statistical associations, we cannot say that 
bonding requirements are a bad idea, but we think our results underscore 
the need for both more research on this topic and a cautious approach to 
imposing additional restrictions on entry into the mortgage broker business 
and occupation.218    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
Our study period ends in 2006, just as U.S. foreclosure rates on nonprime 
adjustable rate mortgages began to surge. Financial markets have reacted 
by raising the cost and cutting the availability of funding for both subprime 
and mortgage-  broker-  originated mortgages. State regulators have tight-
ened regulations on mortgage contracts, mortgage origination, and mort-
gage broker licensing as well, and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
of 2008 brings federal oversight to mortgage broker licensing. Anecdotal 
and industry sources indicate that the number of mortgage brokers and 
their market share have fallen substantially as a result. We speculate that 
these developments could be part of a broader process by which the link-
ages between mortgage broker regulation and market outcomes may well 
strengthen over time. Such a result would be consistent with the ﬁ  ndings of 
Law and Kim (2005) that showed that during the early periods of occupa-
tional regulation in the United States, the monopoly impacts were modest. 
As in other occupations that have evolved with near universal licensing in 
the states, surviving mortgage brokers could also eventually beneﬁ  t through 
higher earnings and the ability to control entry. We anticipate that further 
analysis of the issue, with updated statutes, statistical techniques, and better 
measures of monitoring of the occupation, may help policymakers assess 
the quality impacts and monopoly implications of state regulations and 
whether federal regulation would provide a better solution for consumers as 
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Appendix B
Some Evidence on the Politics of Enacting Higher 
Bonding Requirements
To examine the potential endogeneity of mortgage broker regulations, we 
gathered some legislative history information from industry sources and 
regulators in eight states that have raised their bonding requirements at least 
once. Overall, these conversations suggest a somewhat long and complicated 
chain of legislative causality. Successful eﬀorts to raise bonding require-
ments tend to originate from the mortgage broker industry or from state 
regulators rather than directly from consumer groups. However, consumer 
advocacy and issues still can motivate the industry or regulatory proposals, 
and there are also some signs of grass- roots industry opposition to propos-
als made by state mortgage broker associations. In addition, the gestation 
time between an initial legislative proposal and ﬁ  nal passage and implemen-
tation may span several years, so that any market outcomes that may have 
initiated the legislative process may have changed by the time of implementa-
tion. Consumer issues seem to serve as the background from which industry 
and regulatory agency-  initiated bonding requirements emerge, often via a 
multiyear process.
Of the nine increases we discussed, ﬁ  ve were described as ﬁ  rst proposed 
or drafted by the state’s mortgage broker association (Ohio 1999; Texas 
1999; North Carolina 2002; Idaho 2004; Montana 2004), and four were 
described as initiated by the state regulatory authority (New Jersey 2001; 
Tennessee 2001; Ohio 2002; Minnesota 2007). The distinction is somewhat 
blurred by the industry’s frequent practice of vetting its proposals with state 
regulators, which often yields at least technical drafting suggestions but 
sometimes yields more aﬃrmative legislative support from the regulator. 
No successful bonding proposal was said to have been opposed by state 
regulators. Sometimes earlier proposals that had not been vetted with the 
regulator had failed. As a result, regulators have been involved, actively or 
passively, in most of the successful bonding bills we examined.
The stated motivations of the industry and the regulators diﬀered. Indus-
try proposals were described as attempts to make the occupation more pro-
fessional and to provide a degree of consumer protection by inhibiting some 
forms of fraud, thereby enhancing the occupation’s reputation. However, 
industry- supported increases to bonding requirements were sometimes (e.g., 
North Carolina 2002) motivated on narrow grounds, such as to ensure that 
consumers could be compensated if a broker absconded with the relatively 
small amount of cash the customer had entrusted to the broker, but not to 
help the consumer collect on larger judgments for less narrow forms of fraud 
or negligence. By contrast, proposals initiated by the regulatory authorities 
tended to have bonding requirements that were higher and broader in scope, 222    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
with the apparent intentions of providing both more resources to compen-
sate consumers and more incentives for appropriate broker behavior.
None of our sources (which did not include consumer groups) suggested 
that the bonding requirement that passed had been either ﬁ  rst proposed 
or subsequently opposed by consumer advocates. However, the industry’s 
proposal in Texas was in part a response to a much higher bonding proposal 
previously introduced by a legislator on the grounds of consumer protec-
tion, and in at least two other cases (North Carolina 2002; Ohio 1999) the 
industry’s proposal was said to be motivated in part by competing regula-
tory proposals (not including bonding) from consumer groups. Opposition 
to the bonding bills that passed was said to be limited and mainly from 
legislators who were concerned that it might be onerous enough to hurt 
their constituents in the business. In some cases, this was thought to reﬂ  ect, 
in part, grass-  roots lobbying by mortgage brokers at odds with their own 
industry association’s position.
Appendix C
Data for High-  Priced Lending Regressions
Sources: The data for the high- priced lending regressions come from multiple 
sources. The dependent variable and several explanatory variables are from 
data on individual ﬁ  rst-  lien mortgages originated in 2005 and reported per 
the requirements of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)(2007). 
The HMDA data include the Census tract of the property securing the 
mortgage. Using this information, each loan record has also been associated 
with Census data for the loan’s census tract. In addition, staﬀ of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System allowed us to link the loan 
records to data on the distribution of credit scores in each Census tract as 
of December 2004. Three types of “state” (including District of Columbia) 
regulatory variables are also used: an index of anti-  predatory lending laws 
developed by Bostic et al. (2007), an indicator from Pence (2003) on whether 
the state’s standard foreclosure process (as of the late 1990s) allows for deﬁ  -
ciency judgments, and indicators of state regulations on mortgage brokers 
taken from Pahl (2007). All state variables are set according to the state in 
which the property securing the mortgage is located.
Dependent Variable
High- Priced  Loan  Indicator: Using the HMDA records, it is set to 1 if 
the mortgage meets the HMDA deﬁ  nition of a “high- priced” mortgage and 
zero otherwise. In 2005, a ﬁ  rst-  lien mortgage was high-  priced if its annual 
percentage rate (APR, or basically the internal rate of return on scheduled Mortgage Broker Regulations that Matter    2 2 3
mortgage payments over the full term of the loan, assuming all market inter-
est rates referenced in the contract are unchanged) exceeds by 3 percentage 
points or more the average rate on a thirty- year Treasury bond for the month 
in which the mortgage was originated (as determined by a reference rate 
published by the federal banking regulatory agencies).
Explanatory Variables Shown in Tables 6.9 and 6.10
State broker bonding/  net worth requirement: Constructed by the authors 
from information in Pahl (2007), this is the monetary value of the minimum 
bond or net worth required, in 2004, to enter the mortgage broker business, 
converted to units of hundreds of thousands of dollars for our statistical 
analysis. Because some states’ requirements diﬀer by characteristics of the 
ﬁ  rm or individual being licensed, the choice of the minimum amount needed 
to enter is subject to judgment. The dollar values we selected for this vari-
able for each state (before conversion to units of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars) are listed in appendix B.
Index of other state broker licensing requirements: This is an index of the 
strictness of a state’s mortgage broker regulations in 2004 that sums all of 
Pahl’s individual regulatory components except those dealing with net worth 
or bonding.
Index of state anti-  predatory lending laws: An index of the overall strict-
ness of a state’s anti- predatory lending laws, designed for use with 2004 and 
2005 HMDA data (Bostic et al. 2007).
State prohibition of deﬁ  ciency judgments: From Pence, an indicator vari-
able set to 1 if a state’s standard foreclosure procedure bars creditors from 
pursuing deﬁ  ciency judgments when sale of a foreclosed property yields less 
than the amount owed by the borrower, and zero otherwise.
Borrower’s income: The borrower’s income, as stated in the HMDA loan 
record, in $1,000.
Adults in Census tract with very low credit score: In the loan’s Census 
tract, a measure of the percentage of adults with a very low credit score. 
Speciﬁ  cally, 100 times the number of such adults divided by all adults with 
a credit score.
African- American, Asian- American, Hispanic, or female borrower: Dummy 
variables set to 1 if, respectively, the borrower’s race is African-  American, 
the borrower’s race is Asian- American, the borrower’s ethnicity is Hispanic, 
or the borrower is female, as indicated by the HMDA loan record’s infor-
mation on the lead applicant for the loan. (Information on coapplicants is 
ignored; loan records with missing or “not applicable” ethnicity information 
are omitted.)
Additional Explanatory Variables in the Regressions
Loan size: The amount borrowed, as stated in the HMDA loan record, 
in $1,000.224    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
Adults with a missing credit score: In the loan’s Census tract, a measure of 
the percentage of adults without a credit score. Speciﬁ  cally, 100 times the 
number of adults whose credit ﬁ  le lacks a credit score divided by the number 
of adults with a credit ﬁ  le.
Unemployment rate: From Census 2000, the unemployment rate in the 
loan’s Census tract.
Median age: From Census 2000, the median age of all persons in the loan’s 
Census tract.
Median age of housing units: From Census 2000, the median age of all 
structures in the loan’s Census tract.
Minority percentage: From Census 2000, the percentage of minority 
population in the loan’s Census tract. (Minority signiﬁ  es all but those who 
identify as only non-  Hispanic white.)
Median income: From Census 2000, median family income in the loan’s 
Census tract, in $1,000.
Owner- occupied percentage: From Census 2000, owner- occupied housing 
units as a percentage of all housing units in the loan’s Census tract.
Vacant- unit  percentage: From Census 2000 records, vacant housing units 
as a percentage of all housing units in the loan’s Census tract.
Appendix D
Results with Alternative Measurements of Mortgage 
Broker Regulation
In this chapter, we have focused on the relationship between mortgage 
broker bonding or net worth requirements and market outcomes, largely 
because we think that these relationships are relatively consistent and statis-
tically signiﬁ  cant, compared to the relationships between market outcomes 
and the other components of mortgage broker regulation. In tables 6.3, 
6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.9, and 6.10, for example, the variable for licensing require-
ments other than bonding/net worth performs inconsistently. It is signiﬁ  cant 
(and diﬀerent in sign from the bonding variable) in tables 6.4 and 6.5, and 
the mortgage reﬁ  nancing column of table 6.10, but not signiﬁ  cant in tables 
6.3, 6.6, and 6.9, and the home purchase column of table 6.10. However, 
using this index to summarize all of the mortgage broker regulations besides 
bonding or net worth requirements might obscure some strong, consistent 
relationships between individual components and market outcomes, just 
as our overall index of mortgage broker regulation obscured the results we 
have presented on bonding and net worth. To assess this possibility, we have 
reestimated a core set of our regression speciﬁ  cations, consisting of the one- 
lag versions of tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.6, and 6.9 and the two-  lag version of table Mortgage Broker Regulations that Matter    2 2 5
6.5. We modify these regressions to include twenty other mortgage broker 
regulatory components, using the following speciﬁ  cation of the mortgage 
broker variables:
1. The same bonding/  net worth variable as in tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 
and 6.9.
2.  Pahl’s index for individual mortgage broker regulation component j, 
where j ranges over twenty regulatory components other than bonding and 
net worth.
3.  A summated index of all the mortgage broker regulatory components 
not included in 1 and 2.
At the ﬁ  rm level, the components assessed are entry requirements for 
education, experience, or knowledge (via an examination) of the ﬁ  rm’s 
principals as well as ongoing requirements for continuing education of the 
principals. For ﬁ  rms’ managers, we assess similar requirements and an over-
all dummy variable indicating whether any requirements apply to manag-
ers. Requirements assessed for branch managers and for employees parallel 
those for managers, and we also assess the requirement to maintain an in- 
state oﬃce location.
We ﬁ nd that these speciﬁ  cations generally have little eﬀect on the size 
or signiﬁ  cance of the coeﬃcient on our bonding/  net worth variable. That 
is, the results we have presented on the relationship between bonding or 
net worth requirements and market outcomes are nearly always robust to 
the alternative speciﬁ  cations described previously. Most of the individual 
components are signiﬁ  cant for at least one of the seven labor and mortgage 
market relationships tested. (Tables 6.6 and 6.9 include two market out-
comes each, with both subprime and all foreclosures in table 6.6 and both 
reﬁ  nance and home purchase mortgages in table 6.9.) However, only six of 
the twenty components are signiﬁ  cantly related to three or more outcomes, 
and only employee regulation provisions matter for most labor and mort-
gage market outcomes. We will brieﬂ  y summarize some of the relationships 
that seem of potential interest for further research.
The relationships between our bonding/  net worth variable and market 
outcomes were generally robust. The coeﬃcient on this variable retained its 
sign and at least a 10 percent signiﬁ  cance level in all of the new speciﬁ  cations 
for tables 6.3 (number of brokers), 6.5 (subprime originations), and 6.6 (fore-
closures). In table 6.4 (broker earnings), the bonding/ net worth variable was 
only marginally signiﬁ  cant. Not surprisingly, the p-  value for its coeﬃcient 
rose from below 10 percent in table 6.4 to between 10 and 20 percent in nine 
of the twenty alternative regressions. Its coeﬃcient changed little in most of 
these cases and never fell below 0.43, compared to 0.60 in table 6.4.
In the alternative regressions for table 6.9 (high- priced loans in 2005), the 
bonding/ net worth variable retained its positive sign and at least a 10 percent 
signiﬁ  cance level except when the alternative variable was either the overall 226    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
dummy for presence of employee regulation or the requirement for continu-
ing education for branch managers. The eﬀect of the employee regulation 
dummy in the reﬁ  nance mortgage regression was somewhat marginal; it 
lowered the coeﬃcient for bonding/ net worth from 0.054 to 0.047 and raised 
its p-  value to 15 percent. It had a stronger eﬀect in the purchase mortgage 
equation, cutting the coeﬃcient in half and raising its p- value to 50 percent. 
The employee regulation dummy seems to parallel the bonding/  net worth 
variable in equation 9, in that its coeﬃcient is also positive. For purchase 
mortgages it is also signiﬁ  cant, with a p-  value of 7.2 percent. The require-
ment for branch manager continuing education had similar eﬀects on the 
size and signiﬁ  cance of the bonding/  net worth coeﬃcient and also became 
signiﬁ  cant itself (p-  value of 5.5 percent) in the purchase mortgage equa-
tion. However, its relationship to high-  price loans was negative, –0.08. One 
possible explanation for the signiﬁ  cance of the branch manager continuing-
 education variable is that it is nonzero for only four states. Because table 6.9 
is a cross-  sectional regression where we cannot estimate state ﬁ  xed eﬀects, 
the branch manager continuing-  education variable may be reﬂ  ecting gen-
eral ﬁ  xed eﬀects for those four states. Data for additional years are needed 
to better resolve this question. These two exceptions in table 6.9 and the 
unsurprising sensitivity of the marginally signiﬁ  cant results from table 6.4 
show the need for further research on the relationship of bonding or net 
worth and market outcomes. We nonetheless consider our main results on 
these relationships to be relatively robust, in light of the many alternative 
speciﬁ  cations we tested.
Are other components of mortgage broker regulation also related to our 
labor and mortgage market outcomes? Not to the same degree, with the pos-
sible exception of the overall dummy variable for employee regulation. This 
regulatory indicator is signiﬁ  cant at a 10 percent level or better in six of the 
seven alternative regressions, excluding only the one for higher-  priced reﬁ  -
nance mortgages from table 6.9. In ﬁ  ve of the six cases, where its coeﬃcient 
was signiﬁ  cant its coeﬃcient was of the same sign as the coeﬃcient on the 
bonding/  net worth variable. Only for brokers’ earnings did it diﬀer, with a 
coeﬃcient of –0.05 (p- value 4.3 percent). This component of mortgage bro-
ker regulation merits further research, although its statistical relationships 
with market outcomes (fewer brokers, fewer subprime mortgages, and more 
foreclosures) suggest caution about regarding it as a pro- consumer measure. 
Some of the individual components of employee regulation, such as the 
entry requirements for education, experience, or passage of an examination, 
paralleled the overall employee regulation dummy in many cases but were 
not as consistently signiﬁ  cant across the seven regression estimates.
Only one other regulatory component was individually signiﬁ  cant for 
both a labor market outcome and a mortgage market outcome. This com-
ponent, the educational background of new branch managers, was signiﬁ  -
cantly associated with fewer brokers, more subprime originations, and fewer Mortgage Broker Regulations that Matter    2 2 7
2005 high- priced home purchase mortgages. We are inclined to discount the 
importance of these results because this regulatory indicator was nonzero 
in only two states, Florida and Nevada, as of 2004.
The other individual regulatory components with signiﬁ  cant eﬀects mainly 
aﬀected the mortgage market but not the labor market. The human capital 
entry requirements for ﬁ  rm managers (education, experience, examinations) 
are perhaps the most interesting in this group. Nineteen states imposed at 
least one of these requirements in 2004, and the experience requirement was 
signiﬁ  cant in the alternative regressions for subprime originations, subprime 
and total foreclosures, and 2005 high-  priced home-  purchase mortgages. In 
all four cases, the coeﬃcient on the manager experience requirement was 
opposite to the coeﬃcient on the bonding/  net worth variable, or at least 
superﬁ  cially more pro-  consumer. The overall dummy for the presence of 
manager requirements parallels the manager experience requirement in the 
two foreclosure regressions. Likewise, the requirement that the brokerage 
ﬁ  rm maintain an in- state oﬃce was associated with fewer subprime origina-
tions and more subprime and total foreclosures. These regulatory factors 
also seem to be candidates for further research.
Two other human capital requirements for branch managers—experience 
and continuing education—were signiﬁ  cant (and opposite in sign to the 
bonding/  net worth coeﬃcient) in the alternative mortgage market regres-
sions for subprime originations, foreclosures, and 2005 high-  priced home-
 purchase mortgages. We have already noted that branch manager continuing 
education requirements prevailed in only four states as of 2004, but the 
branch manager experience variable was nonzero in eight states and may 
thus be of some interest for future research.
We omit a full discussion of the results for the third mortgage variable 
in each regression, the index of the remaining mortgage broker regulation 
requirements.34 For the table 6.3 alternative regressions, it was signiﬁ  cant in 
only two cases. For table 6.4, it was often signiﬁ  cant (nine of seventeen cases) 
when it directly or indirectly (via the overall employee regulation dummy) 
included the employee education and examination indicators but not when 
these moved from the index to become the individual component. In both 
tables 6.3 and 6.4, when the index was signiﬁ  cant, its coeﬃcient was opposite 
in sign to the bonding/  net worth coeﬃcient. In table 6.5 alternative regres-
sions, the ﬁ  rst lag of the index was signiﬁ  cant in thirteen of ﬁ  fteen cases when 
an employee regulation was not the individual variable but in only one of 
the ﬁ  ve cases when an employee requirement became the individual compo-
nent. (Its second lag was never signiﬁ  cant.) In all cases, the coeﬃcient on the 
index agreed in sign with the bonding/  net worth coeﬃcient. In the table 6.6 
alternative regressions, the index was signiﬁ  cant in three cases for subprime 
34. These and other detailed results from our alternative regressions are available from the 
authors.228    Morris M. Kleiner and Richard M. Todd
foreclosures (with a coeﬃcient of opposite sign for the in-  state oﬃce and 
overall employee regulation variables) and in seven cases for total foreclo-
sures (with a coeﬃcient of opposite sign for the overall employee regulation 
variable). In the alternative regressions for table 6.9, the index was generally 
insigniﬁ  cant, except in some of the home-  purchase mortgage regressions 
with a managerial human capital variable as the individual component.
The results in this appendix show that our chapter has far from exhausted 
the information in our data. We highlight, in particular, that opportunity for 
other researchers to create and analyze alternative indices and subindices 
of mortgage broker regulation from the extensive regulatory history in Pahl 
(2007).
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